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Abstract
The enlargement of the EU has implications for the national defence requirements
and therefore national defence policy of European nations. In light of the freedom
of movement of citizens between member states it is appropriate to consider the im-
plications of a country’s military expenditure for it’s macroeconomy and specifically
on the flows of migration between member states. Traditionally income differentials,
employment levels and relative standards of living are all factors that influence an
individual’s decision to migrate. To this list we add the level of military expenditure.
Migration from a panel of sixteen CEECs to Germany between 1995 and 2002 is found
to be the result of the level of military expenditure of the source country and the host
country in conjunction with factors consistent with standard theoretical predictions.
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1 Introduction
The expansion of the EU has to an extent changed the way member (and non-member)
states need to address questions of national defence and security. The protection afforded
to EU members should imply that the sums of military expenditure necessary at a national
level are reduced. However General Moschini (chairman of the EU Military Committee)
recently observed1 that for the time being however, “each nation wants to keep, for po-
litical reasons, a complete structure of defence, in order to be strategically autonomous,
sometimes according to old-fashioned territorial concepts.” Hence the current low effi-
ciency of national defence expenditure and the duplication of structures at national level
which should be avoided. His colleague Nick Witney (European Defence Agency)2 agreed
that there was evidence of too much duplication of effort across Europe, even though Eu-
ropeans accounted for a quarter of the world military expenditure the combined EU R&D
budget was five times less than the amount spent by the US3.
Efficient national defence spending is necessary and is undertaken at the expense of
expenditure in other areas of the economy. Thus the further expansion of the EU and the
freedom of movement for its people has implications for the migration flows. Spending a
relatively high proportion of national GDP on national defence is likely to cause migration
with far reaching defence and other implications for the source and host countries within
the EU. There are many reasons that prompt migration. Traditionally theory suggests
that these include wages and employment levels.
Given the impact of military expenditure on growth and freedom of movement of
population of EU member states we test to see whether the ratio of military expenditure
to GDP in the host and the source country has an impact on migration and find that the
military expenditure of both the source and the host nation have an impact on migration.
Military expenditure of the source country has a positive impact on migration, whereas
military expenditure of the foreign country has a negative impact.
1At a press conference held on 10 February 2006 following the WEU conference on 7th and 8th of
February 2006.
2At the same press conference.
3However the level of national military expenditure has often been a proxy for the prospect of conflict.
That is, the amount of military expenditure will increase as the prospect of conflict. For example Turkey
has high levels of military expenditure as a result of the conflict with Greece over Cyprus.
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We construct a panel data set of countries that are either members of the EU, acceding
countries, candidate countries or potential candidates. This is done in order to consider
the substantial migration flows from sixteen CEECs to Germany between 1995 and 2002
and the factors affecting these flows. As well as those factors traditionally found to impact
movement, we consider the effect of military expenditure through its indirect effect on the
standard of living. This research is based on the work of McCormick et al (2002), who
explain potential migration through income differentials and employment rates in the host
and source countries as well as military expenditure.
The profiles of the 16 CEEC’s included in our sample are diverse. The average unem-
ployment rates of the countries range between 4 and 15% and new entrants are higher.
GDP per capita is typically high for EU members and relatively low for acceding countries,
while the ratio of military expenditure to GDP ranges widely between .77% and 5%. The
new issues to consider regarding the implications of such military expenditure with the
freedom of movement by nationals between EU member states. There is a trade off and
the opportunity cost of high levels of military expenditure is great therefore it may be
timely for member states to reconsider their military expenditure budgets.
There are many factors that influence the rate of growth of a country and in turn the
standard of living of its population. Allocation to the military budget for example, implies
foregoing allocation to the non-military budget and subsequently a trade-off between mili-
tary budgets and social expenditure (Brauer, 2002). Therefore, high or increased military
expenditure implies the existence of an opportunity cost between social expenditure and
quality of living. For as long as governments tax their populations to finance the military
sector, they reduce the private sector’s resources and are likely to affect consumption and
investment. Little has been said in the literature about the influence of military expen-
diture and indeed the link between the military expenditure of the home country on the
migration flows. Most of the literature in this area deals with military expenditure and
growth. However it is likely that the relationship is more complex then previously sug-
gested in the literature as military expenditure may be a proxy for conflict. That is it
is likely to be high and/ or increased in regions where the prospect of conflict is high or
increasing.
The paper proceeds with an outline of the European Security and Defence arrange-
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ments in section 2 and a review of the literature in section 3. A discussion of the model
used, its specification and the characteristics of the data set used in the estimations are
presented in section 4. The results of the dynamic panel estimations are presented in
section 5 with the policy implications of these results discussed in section 6. Section 7
concludes.
2 European Security and Defence
One of the great political objectives of Europe is to maintain its stability with a solid
security framework. The development of the framework goes back to the start of European
integration when the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was added to the
political agenda. The parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) was
Europe’s first Security and Defence Assembly founded in 19544 when the 1948 Brussels
treaty was modified. The Treaty contains an unconditional mutual defence clause (Article
V) and links WEU member countries with NATO (Article IV). Its role has developed and
was included in 1991 in the new provisions on security policy in the Treaty of Maastricht.
The WEU comprises 400 parliamentarians from the national parliaments of 37 Euro-
pean countries, including all EU member states (including the ten signatory states of the
modified Brussels Treaty) and the European members of NATO as well as Russia, Ukraine
and the Balkan states. There are different voting and participation rights depending upon
the category of membership. Full members5have full voting rights. Affiliate members6 are
entitled to vote in committee and in plenary on the substantive texts (recommendations)
that are submitted to the plenary session. WEU observer countries and representatives
from other EU member states whose governments have full rights in the European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP)7 but no status in WEU are also entitled to vote in commit-
tee. Affiliate associate partner delegates8 take part in all Assembly activities including
4The first session was held in 1955.
5Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands and the UK
6Affiliate members include the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lativa, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia
7ESDP is a move from nation based defence towards a security position of the European Union.
8Associate Members include Iceland, Norway and Turkey; Affiliate Associate Members include Bul-
garia, Romania. Permanent Observers include Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, Affiliate
Permanent Observers Cyprus and Malta and Affiliate Associate Partner is Croatia.
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committee meetings and plenary sessions but do not vote on the texts and may speak
in plenary debates. Permanent guests9 and special guests10 countries may also speak in
plenary debates.
The EU defence arrangements developed with the agreement between the UK and
France11 that the EU should have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so in order
to respond to international crises. The aim was to not duplicate, but to complement NATO
structures. EU-NATO relations and cooperations were functioning well on the basis of
the Berlin plus agreements. EU crisis management capabilities accrued from 1999 initially
with targets of a 60 000 strong EU crisis reaction force. The intention was to create
a separable but not separate forces that could be made available for European led crisis
response operations other than collective defence12. The force would be able to mount and
lead crisis management operations in response to international crises where the Alliance
as a whole is not engaged. Decisions relating to crisis management tasks with military or
defence implications are taken in accordance with Article 23 of the Treaty on EU however
member states retain the right to decide if and when their national forces are deployed. The
1992 St ‘Petersberg tasks’ define the scope of crisis-management operations to which the
EU governments wished to respond and continues to guide crisis management missions of
the EU. Including humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping and missions of combat
forces in crisis management including missions undertaken in Yugoslavia, Albania, Croatia,
Macedonia and Serbia.
Dialogue continues as to how best to preserve national parliaments’ security13 and
pool them with the complementary competences of the European Parliament in the field
of civil crisis management. The Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the EU
9Russian Federation, Ukraine
10Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM (Macedonia), Serbia and Montenegro
11St Malo Summit, December 1998
12The European Security Strategy requires joint forces of a high quality and high readiness group with
a comprehensive basket of capabilities to which all member states could contribute according to their
resources. There is also a need to create EU command and control structures as well as non-military
components.
13Proposal for European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA) to monitor the activities of the EU
security bodies from the perspective of national parliamentarians (Lisbon Initiative 2000)is one possible
option.
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is appended to the Constitutional Treaty currently in the consultation phase. The role
of the WEU as the acting inter-parliamentary platform for the ESDP on the basis of the
parliamentary instruments for which the WEU legal framework makes provision will be
largely obsolete with the advent of the European Constitutional Treaty14. The Treaty
is intended to promote confidence in the EU provision for its members and therefore
encourage economic growth.
3 Military Expenditure and Growth
The question of the impact of military expenditure on economic growth has exercised
academics for over thirty years. Benoit (1973) found a positive effect of the share of
military expenditure on growth but others since have not been able to confirm this result.
Military expenditure has not been found to be an important determinant of growth15.
Recently Dunne et al (2005) highlights why the literature presents conflicting views as to
the impact of military expenditure on growth and suggests that the often used Feder-Ram
model should be avoided and that the augmented Solow and Barro models hold better
prospects.
A variety of recent studies across a spectrum of countries including some of those con-
sidered in our analysis found that military expenditure does in fact affect economic growth.
The impact on long and short term growth varies between countries. Yildirim et al (2005)
found that military expenditure enhanced economic growth in Middle Eastern countries
and Turkey during the 1990’s. In the case of Cyprus, Kollias et al(2004) find a presence
of bidirectional instantaneous causality between defence spending and growth. Karagol
and Palaz (2004) identify a long run equilibrium relationship between GNP and defence
expenditures and a unidirectional causality between variables from defence expenditure
to economic growth in the case of Turkey. Where a shock to defence spending saw GNP
decrease. Defence expenditures and external debt for Turkey are co-integrated. Karagol
(2005) find evidence of long and short run unidirectional causality running from defence
14The Constitutional Treaty includes a solidarity clause giving member states the possibility to request
aid and assistance from the other EU countries in the event of a terrorist attack. There is also a non-binding
mutual defence clause.
15The growth literature has typically focused on long term growth of output rather than the short term
effects.
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expenditures to external debt but not vice versa16 And in more recent work Karagol (2006)
finds that the defence expenditures have a positive effect on external debt stock. Impulse
response functions of GNP to defence expenditures tended to hike within two years ahead
and dipped sharply by two years and thereafter continued at a positive level.
In Europe, there is evidence that military expenditures are often used as a variable of
economic adjustment and that inertia effects are important. Coulomb and Fontanel(2005)
find that since 1990 French military expenditures are more of an economic burden than
a driving force. This may in part be due to their procurement procedure. Dunne et
al (forthcoming) show how concentration depends on willingness of producers to import
their military needs and on relative size of external market of non-producers. They find
substantial gains to producers from cooperation in procurement process and small gains
to non-producers involved in regional arms race. Also arms export control that the limit
level of technology that can be exported to non-producers distribute these cooperative
gains from producers to non-producers.
In other parts of the world Yildirim and Ocal (2006) find a mutual causal relationship
between the military expenditures of India and Pakistan17. Military expenditure does
not Granger cause economic growth in Pakistan, however there is causality from military
expenditure to economic growth in India. Military expenditure is found to hinder economic
growth in India in the long run but has a growth promoting effect in the short run. In
Taiwan, Lee and Chang (2006) find evidence of the existence of a long run equilibrium
co-integrated relationship between defence expenditure, GDP, labour and capital stock.
A bidirectional causal relationship exists in the long run between defence spending and
GDP in Taiwan implying that increasing defence spending in Taiwan is an effective means
to boost overall economic performance and the improved economy leads to further defence
expenditure. However defence spending is a major means of adjusting for disequilibria
that occur in the system.
The military burden does indeed have a positive impact on the share of external debt to
GDP in small industrializing countries (Dunne et al, 2004a). However, there is no evidence
that the military burden had any impact on the evolution of debt in Argentina and Brazil
but some evidence that military burden tended to increase debt in Chile (Dunne et al,
16For a data set of the period 1955 - 2000.
17The data set used was 1949 - 2003.
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2004b). Chile was the least affected by acute financial crisis resulting from debt problems
although its relative levels of debt were as high or higher. Suggesting that the military
burden maybe important in determining debt in countries but it is only of significance
when it is not swamped by other macroeconomic and international factors. The arms race
effect was found to affect countries long run growth. Ihori (2004) finds the ratio of security
spending to GDP increases with economic growth if defence technology has a fixed benefit.
Even in the US, Cuaresma and Reitschuler (2004) found evidence of the level dependent
effect of military expenditure on GDP growth. The positive externality effect of defence
spending prevails for relatively lower levels of defence spending and reverts its influence
for higher levels.
A large literature then exists on the impact of military expenditure on growth with
evidence that there are short-term positive demand effects, but adverse long-term effects.
Standard migration theory would then suggest indirect effect on migration through changes
in relative income. Little work has been done in this area, however, on CEEC’s and to
the best of our knowledge no study exists on the direct effect of military expenditure on
migration flows. This the focus for the rest of the paper.
4 The Model and Data
We model the long-term relationship between the stock of migrants, GDP per capita, the
unemployment rate, and a measure of military expenditure as a proportion of GDP. We
assume (as McCormick et al., 2002) that the rate of change in the stock of migrants or
the share of the population which already resides in the foreign countries is determined
by the economic variables such as, the difference in the log of per capita incomes and the
employment rates in the foreign and the home countries.
In this study we attempt to identify the factors that trigger migration to Germany
and especially focus on the role that military expenditures might play in the decision to
migrate. We focus on the impact that the prospect of conflict has as the main factor
prompting national military expenditure. The model presented here relies on the work of
Hatton (1995) and McCormick et al. (2002) and is based on the premise that migration is
an investment in human capital, the returns to which are determined by expectations of
future income. These expectations of income in the country of destination are conditioned
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by the perceived opportunity to find a job in its labour market (McCormick et al., 2002).
We augment the standard migration model by considering military expenditures in the
home and the foreign countries as possible determinants of migration.
Theory suggests that migration is determined by the income differential between the
host and the source country, as well as the employment rates in the host and the source
countries. The income differential between the host and the source country, and the con-
ditions in the labour market of the host country described by its employment rate, would
be expected to have a positive impact on migration, while the conditions in the labour
market of the source country would intuitively be expected to have a negative impact. We
anticipate that military expenditures in the source countries will boost migration signify-
ing a positive migration-military expenditure relationship. On the other hand, military
expenditures of the host country are expected to manifest a negative nexus with the po-
tential to migrate. Therefore, our model is of the following form:
(∆SM)i,t = δ0 + δ1(∆SM)i,t−1 + δ2∆ln(EF )i,t + δ3∆ln(EH)i,t + δ4∆ln
(
YF
YH
)
i,t
+ δ5ln(EF )i,t−1 + δ6ln(EH)i,t−1 + δ7ln
(
YF
YH
)
i,t−1
+ δ8
(
MEH
GDPH
)
i,t−1
+ δ9
(
MEF
GDPF
)
i,t−1
+ εi,t (1)
where the annual change in the ratio of the stock of migrants to the source population
is, ∆SMi,t. The differential in real wages, which is proxied by the annual change in the
difference of the GDP per capita at current prices in US dollars between the host and the
source country, ∆ln
(
YF
YH
)
i,t
. Employment opportunities as proxied by the annual change
in the employment rate (1-unemployment rate) in the host country, ∆ln(EF )i,t, and the
source country, ∆ln(EH)i,t. The value of the difference of the GDP per capita between the
host and the source country lagged one year, ln
(
YF
YH
)
i,t−1
. The value of the employment
rate lagged one year in the host country, ln(EF )i,t−1, and the source country, ln(EH)i,t−1.
The lagged by one year value of military expenditures over GDP at current prices in US
dollars for the source country,
(
MEH
GDPH
)
i,t−1
, and the host country,
(
MEF
GDPF
)
i,t−1
. And δ
are unknown constant parameters to be estimated, F denotes the foreign or host country,
H the home or source country, and ε is an unobserved spherical disturbance term.
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This model is able to capture both short and long run effects as it includes variables
specified both in the level, lagged and others, which are first differenced. The variables
specified in the level determine a dynamic relationship between the stock of migrants and
the income and employment variables in the long run, whereas the rate of change variables
determine the response of migration to short term fluctuations of the explanatory variables.
We use aggregated data for 16 Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs)
including Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Malta,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and the
former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia for the period 1995-2002. The countries chosen
are either EU members or in the case of Bulgaria and Romania are acceding.18 Candidate
countries include Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey. While Serbia is one of the potential
candidate countries. Our panel consists of i countries over a period of t years. The total
number of observations included in our sample is 128.
We use a variety of data sources to construct the necessary variables. Data on
GDP per capita at current prices in millions US dollars and total population come from
the National Accounts Main Aggregates Database maintained by the United Nations
(http://www.un.org/). Data on the stock of migrants for the main Central and East-
ern European countries included in our sample were available on the Migration Informa-
tion Source (Global Data Center) (http://www.migrationinformation.org/). Yearly data
on unemployment rates come from the LABORSTA database maintained by the Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO) (http://laborsta.ilo.org/). Finally, data on military
expenditures for the receiving and the home countries were provided by the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (http://www.sipri.org/).
The average values for the main aggregates by country are set out in Table 1.
5 Results of Dynamic Panel Estimation
The parameters of equation (1) are estimated by applying the Arellano and Bond (1991)
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel technique. The actual estimation
is based on the first-differences of all variables included in the model, which results in a
new disturbance term exhibiting, by construction, first-order autocorrelation. However,
18In May 2006 the Commission approved the monitoring report.
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to ensure unbiased and consistent estimates it is important to ensure that the differenced
equations are free from second or higher order autocorrelation. The statistical adequacy
of the model is therefore established when two conditions are met; firstly the generated
residuals do not exhibit second-order autocorrelation, this property is checked by the use
of the m2 statistic of Arellano and Bond (1991), and secondly that the over-identifying
restrictions are not rejected as measured by the Sargan (1958) test. Sargan (1958) tests
the validity of the instrument set based on the correlation between the instruments and
the residuals. Based on a Chi-squared distribution, our results (presented in Table 2)
suggest that instruments and residuals are not correlated. The Sargan test fails to reject
the null hypothesis that the over identifying restrictions are valid. The growth of the
military burden is influenced by economics and strategic factors. External war has a
negative impact on growth of the military burden. This is because there is an increase in
the military expenditure post conflict to replace equipment and better prepare for future
conflict.
The estimation process is carried out in two stages and from the first stage inferences
can be drawn about the coefficients and the second for inferences on model specification.
Initially we test the factors that traditionally are thought to influence the levels of migra-
tion. The results of regression 1 in Table 2 show that those variables traditionally thought
to influence migration; the employment opportunities in both the source and the host
country, as well as the ratio of GDP per capita all do significantly influence migration.
The second regression confirms that not only are the traditional factors that are
thought to affect migration significant, as expected, but also the level of military ex-
penditure of the source country is significant. However the results of regression 3 suggest
that military expenditure in the host country is not significant; that is the impact of host
military expenditure without the consideration of source military expenditure is not sig-
nificant in the decision to migrate. The results of regression 4 are more interesting. If we
look at the results of regression 4, we note that the military expenditure of both the host
and the source countries when considered together has a significant impact on migration.
This suggests that those who migrate may do so because their standard of living is af-
fected by the level of military expenditure as a proportion of GDP consider where they
will go and will be unlikely to choose a host country that has a higher level of military
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expenditure as a proportion of its GDP than the source country. Indeed the size of the
impact of military expenditure on the decision to migrate is larger for the host country’s
expenditure than that for the source country.19
The hypothesis test results presented at the bottom of Table 2 confirms that the
impact of miliary expenditure in the host and the source countries are important factors
affecting migration. The null hypothesis that military expenditure of the home and the
host countries has no impact is rejected as δ8 and δ9 are not statistically equal to zero
(implying that they both have some impact), nor are they statistically equal to each other.
To determine the impact of the factors in the host and the source country the Wilcoxon
Test is used to test the hypothesis that the various factors in each country have identical
median values and identical distributions. The results presented in Table 3 indicate that
the populations from which the samples have been taken do not in fact have identical
median values and identical distributions as the null hypothesis is rejected in every instance
with the p-value of zero in every instance, that is the associated factors between the source
and host country are not of equal impact on the decision to migrate.
Our results indicate that an increase in military expenditure has triggered migration
flows to Germany as aggregate consumption has decreased due to the increased military ex-
penditure which is financed by public funds. This result is of special importance for Turkey.
Annually, Turkey is obliged to incur high military costs due to its strategic position in
Eastern Europe, which is driven by NATO commitments, fears of Islamic fundamentalism,
the desire to suppress Kurdish militants and disagreements with Greece (Brauer, 2001).
In contrast, member states’ whose military expenditure did not differ significantly from
the expenditure of other Eastern European countries during the communist era will not
be as affected.
Our results show that based on the current amount of military expenditure of the
countries in the sample if that military expenditure of the source country has a 2% impact
on the stock of migrants. Our results imply that on average if military expenditure of
the 16 source countries considered in our analysis were increase by 50% then there would
be an average increase in the migrant stock per population of 3%. If however military
19Note that there is only one host country (Germany) in this analysis. A formal test that migrants choose
their destination on the basis of the military expenditure in that country requires a major extension of
this study to incorporate several host nations. This would be a fruitful area for future research.
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expenditure of these countries were to be cut by 50% there would be a fall in the stock of
migrants of 1%. This implies that on average there would be no migrant stock of people
wanting to migrate to Germany in 12 out of the 16 countries we considered if military
expenditure of these countries were to be cut in half. Only Croatia (3.62%), Macedonia
(1.35%), Serbia and Montenegro (5.64%) and Turkey (2%) would have a migrant stock
wanting to move to Germany. On average whilst these countries have amongst the highest
average rates of unemployment, they are not the top 4 on the list in Table 1. In terms of
GDP per capita these countries although amongst the lowest, do not exhibit the lowest
percentage in the sample. In terms of military expenditure as a proportion of GDP;
Croatia has the highest at 5%, Turkey 4.6%, Macedonia 2.93%. Others over 2% including
Romania (2.65%) and Cyprus (2.63%) have low migrant stocks per population therefore
the reason for high migrant stock of these four Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey
(after a 50% reduction in military expenditure) maybe due to the populations perceived
threat of conflict. Thus the results on average reflect the unrest of the countries (decrease
in the quality of living due to fear of war) rather than the impact that military expenditure
has on GDP and growth (standards of living).
We have focused on the impact of a change in the source countries military expenditure,
we turn now to consider the impact of a change in the military expenditure of the host
country (Germany). Our results show that if the host country was to increase its military
expenditure by 50% the stock of migrants would fall by 105%, that is, no longer would
it be a destination of choice for migrants from CEEC’s but also there would be Germans
wanting to leave Germany to live elsewhere. Conversely, if Germany, the host country
were to reduce it’s military expenditure by 50% on average the migration stock would
double. That is, assuming the status quo remains our results indicate that the migrant
stock will be reduced by 70%. When military expenditure is halved so too is the impact
on the migrant stock and at that level of military expenditure as a proportion of GDP
only 35% of people remain in the stock - implying that 35% of people wishing to migrate
has been reduced by 35%. Half the migrant stock has been turned away from migrating to
the host country. This implies that the decision to migrate is calculated and migrants do
not want to move from one country to another when they perceive their standard of living
to be compromised. Instead migrants will only want to go when the perceived prospects
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are improved.
6 Policy Implications - Military Expenditure and Migration
The expansion of the EU to date20 has prompted (or is likely to prompt) migration from
accession countries to those in the West to be more intense due to the agreement of free
movement of workers among the countries of the European Union (Drinkwater et al., 2002).
As a consequence, a deterioration of living standards of unskilled workers in conjunction
with job displacement and wage losses triggered by the inflow of low-cost labour and the
de-localization of plants from the West to the East is feared (Boeri and Brucker, 2001).
Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) predict long run migration rates to potentially be between
2 - 3 percent of the population of the source country. However, these migration rates are
likely to fall as living standards in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs)
improve (Drinkwater et al, 2002).
As the EU is set to expand further in 200721 and then again in 2015 with the likely
inclusion of Turkey and the former Yugoslavia if they meet with the accession criteria
of the EU. Their inclusion and the new freedom of movement that it brings to their
populations are set to have an impact on the population movement between member
states. Therefore our findings have implications for how member and non-member states
should think about their domestic policy. The freedom of movement afforded to people
of member states means that movement of skilled and unskilled labour in search of an
improved standard of living is likely.
Rights and privileges afforded to EU members mean that the amount of national mil-
itary expenditure that is necessary has changed and this has implications for alternatives
that the money can be used for and therefore perceived standards of living.
Clearly our results suggest that national military expenditure has an impact on mi-
gration stock. Therefore public policy needs to account for this fact with appropriate
measures. To help determine what might be the appropriate policy option; changes in
20On the 1st of May in 2004 Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Malta, Slovenia and Slovakian Republic joined the European Union.
21Bulgaria and Romania are recommended to receive candidate status with the view to joining the EU
on the 1st of January 2007.
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national or EU military expenditure, measures to deal with migration flows or some com-
bination of these. We have considered what would happen on average to the migration
stock under a number of alternative scenarios22. Our results suggest that a favourable
policy option is likely to be to encourage a reduction in national military expenditure. A
significant driver of this will hinge on the development and evolution of the ESDP and the
provision of EU protection which inspires member (and non-member) confidence23. For
candidate countries of our sample some short term migration constraints so as to avoid a
large exodus of skilled and unskilled labour around the time of accession which will drain
the source economy and flood the host countries.
7 Conclusions
The expansion of the EU has implications for the economies of both the accession countries
as well as those established EU members. The agreement of free movement of workers
among the countries of the EU is set to influence the labour markets in both the host and
the source countries. In this paper we analyzed the determinants of international migration
from 16 CEEC’s to Germany between 1995 and 2002. During this period there have been
no restrictions on migration. Theoretical predictions suggest that income differentials
between the Western and Eastern European countries prompt migration, as do the rates
of unemployment in both the host and the sending countries. The standard of living,
which is influenced by the level of military expenditure in the source country and the host
country, is also likely to be of special importance.
The migration model employed to explain migration flows from these countries to Ger-
many is initially estimated using a dynamic panel GMM technique. In the first instance,
we find that the income differential between the host and the source country is a factor
in triggering migration flows, as are the labour market flows of the host country. The in-
creasing employment rate in the host country as well as a positive difference in per capita
income between host and home country increases the long-run stock of migrants.
The results so far are consistent with other modelling work done in the area of migra-
tion, the novelty of this paper however is the inclusion of a measure of military expenditure
22If military expenditure in the source countries changed and if military expenditure did not change.
23This includes reducing the potential for the possibility of free riding.
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as a proportion of GDP which gives an indication of standard of living , in the migration
model. We find that standard of living in the source and the host country is significant
in the decision to migrate. More specifically, we show that to the extent that military
expenditure affects the standard of living as measured by the proportion of military ex-
penditure to GDP influences migration. More generally, the positive relationship between
the standard of living measure and migration implies that countries with higher military
expenditure such as Turkey are more likely to see higher migration rates. In other words,
living standards (as influenced by the expenditure on national military defence) possess
the lion’s share in the decision to migrate. Potential migrants are more willing to move
as living standards in the source country worsen, which is reflected in the level of real
wage (GDP per capita) and the standard of living measure of miliary expenditure and a
proportion of that nations’ GDP.
Military expenditure is a proxy for potential conflict which implies an incentive for
migration to where less conflict is likely. However, our results suggest that accession
countries need to have the incentive to reduce their national levels of military expenditure
despite the traditional territorial fears. The reduction of military expenditure of Bulgaria
and Romania for example would all but eliminate the migrant stock as the standard of
living would on average improve by spending the money in other areas to help economic
growth.
As to candidate countries Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey a reduction in military ex-
penditure would not wipe out migrant stocks, due in part to the fear of conflict in these
countries and the regions and therefore the perceived prospects for a better life in Ger-
many. Therefore steps need to be taken to control the migration flows in the short run
as and when they join the EU. This advise has been given previously in the literature
in other contexts. Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999 suggest that the anticipation that mi-
grants will move from the accession candidate countries towards the western economies,
provides the opportunity for the imposition of a temporary restriction of migration flows
in terms of a Common EU migration policy. It is obvious that the European governments
have an incentive to impose a temporary, selective immigration policy (such as an auction
system or bilateral agreements) towards the candidate countries . However, Boeri and
Brucker, (2001) advise that migration flows be kept under control for a transitional pe-
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riod. In other words, the western countries could open gradually, but immediately, their
labour markets to migrants from the accession candidates. After a decrease in military
expenditure is considered the overall stock of migrants comes from four countries that all
have heightened prospects for conflict. Therefore it is likely that a reduction in national
military expenditure prompted by confidence in the EU protection measures, will lead to
a reduction in the migration stock of most countries we considered.
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 Country Unemployment Rates GDP Per Capita 
 Migrants Stock
Population
 
ME
GDP
 
Bulgaria 15.31 1,562 0.44 2.42 
Croatia 13.13 4,422 4.62 5 
Cyprus 4.47 12,220 0.12 2.63 
Czech Republic 6.52 5,867 0.21 1.76 
Estonia 10.97 3,930 0.24 1.24 
Hungary 7.69 4,804 0.53 1.66 
Latvia 14.80 2,899 0.29 0.89 
Lithuania 15.38 2,967 0.23 1.14 
TFYR Macedonia 31.20 1,923 2.35 2.93 
Malta 6.70 9,742 0.08 0.77 
Poland 14.43 4,274 0.75 1.92 
Romania 6.99 1,722 0.42 2.65 
Serbia and Montenegro 13.39 1,353 6.64 - 
Slovakia 15.15 3,928 0.22 2.18 
Slovenia 6.99 10,337 0.94 1.44 
Turkey 7.55 2,738 3 4.6 
Total CEECs 11.34 4,668 1.32 2.21 
Germany 8.96 26,268 - 1.52 
Notes: Unemployment rates, stock of migrants over total population, and military expenditure over 
GDP appear in percentage terms, while GDP per capita is expressed in current US dollars. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - Mean values for the main aggregates by country
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Dependent 
variable: 
,i tSM∆  
Regression 
(1) 
Regression 
(2) 
Regression 
(3) 
Regression 
(4) 
Regressor Estimated Coefficients (z-scores) 
, 1i tSM −∆  
-0.001*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.001* 
(-1.81) 
-0.001*** 
(-2.84) 
-0.0003 
(-0.36) 
,
ln( )F i tE∆  0.02
*** 
(3.20) 
0.06*** 
(3.18) 
0.02* 
(1.72) 
0.07*** 
(4.92) 
,
ln( )H i tE∆  -0.02
*** 
(-3.11) 
-0.01* 
(-1.66) 
-0.02*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.02*** 
(-2.77) 
1,
ln
−






∆
tiH
F
Y
Y
 
0.001* 
(1.68) 
0.002*** 
(3.08) 
0.001* 
(1.89) 
0.002*** 
(3.19) 
, 1ln( )F i tE −  0.01
*** 
(5.71) 
0.01*** 
(4.76) 
0.009*** 
(2.91) 
0.02*** 
(4.20) 
, 1ln( )H i tE −  -0.006
** 
(-2.51) 
0.0005 
(0.20) 
-0.006** 
(-2.28) 
-0.001 
(-0.77) 
1,
ln
−






tiH
F
Y
Y
 
0.0006*** 
(2.75) 
0.002*** 
(3.80) 
0.0004 
(1.45) 
0.002*** 
(3.56) 
, 1
H
H i t
ME
GDP
−
 
 
 
 
- 
0.02*** 
(3.05) - 
0.02*** 
(3.17) 
, 1
F
F i t
ME
GDP
−
 
 
 
 
- - 
0.24 
(1.13) 
-0.70** 
(-2.08) 
Observations 78 72 78 72 
Diagnostics 
1m  -1.14 -0.65 -1.16 -0.65 
2m  0.29 0.96 0.44 1.27 
Sargan 9.56 (p-value:0.97) 
9.79 
(p-value:0.97) 
9.73 
(p-value:0.97) 
6.12 
(p-value:0.99) 
Hypothesis Testing 
0 8: 0H δ =  - 
2x = 9.31*** 
(p-value:0.00) - 
2x = 10.04*** 
(p-value:0.00) 
0 9: 0H δ =  - - 
2x = 1.29 
(p-value:0.25) 
2x = 4.34** 
(p-value:0.03) 
0 8 9: 0H δ δ= =  - - - 
2x = 10.38*** 
(p-value:0.00) 
0 8 9:H δ δ=  - - - 
2x = 4.55** 
(p-value:0.03) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses denote z-scores, 1m  and 2m  are residual first and second order serial 
correlation tests, while Sargan stands for the over-identifying restrictions test. One, two, three asterisks 
denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. 
Table 2: Estimation Results
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Hypothesis Testing Wilcoxon Test (p-values) 
0 :      F HH per cap GDP per cap GDP=  
-9.81 
(0.00) 
0 : F HH Unempl Unempl=  
4.36 
(0.00) 
0 :  F HH ME ME=  
-9.46 
(0.00) 
Notes: The null hypothesis is that, for every given pair, the associated factors between the foreign and 
the home countries are of equal impact.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Wilcoxon Tests - Tests for the equal impact of the factors determining
migration
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